IaN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated : 5-3-2010
Coram
The Honourable Mr.Justice ELIPE DHARMA RAO
and
The Honourable Mr.Justice N. PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR
H.C.P.No.2079 of 2009
V. Jagadeeskumar ... Petitioner
Vs.
1. The Government of Tamil Nadu,
rep.by its Secretary,
Prohibition & Excise Department,
Fort St. George,
Chennai 600 009.
2. The Commissioner of Police,
Egmore,
Chennai 600 008. ... Respondents
This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying this Court to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus, calling for the entire records of the respondents leading to the detention of the father of the petitioner, namely P.Vijayakumar under Act 14 of 1982 as goonda vide detention order No.BDFGISSV/310/2009 dated 17.9.2009 on the file of the second respondent and quash the same as illegal and consequently direct the respondents to set the father of the petitioner at liberty from the Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai.
For Petitioner : Mr.B. Kumar,
Senior Counsel
for Mr.J.Srinivasan
For Respondents : Mr.Kumaresan,
Public Prosecutor,
assisted by
Mr.V.Balasubramanian,
Addl. Public Prosecutor
O R D E R
N. PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR, J.
This writ petition is filed challenging the detention order dated 17.9.2009 passed against the detenu P.Vijayakumar under Act 14 of 1982 by the Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Chennai-8, second respondent herein.
2. In the grounds of detention, 27 ground cases are relied on against the detenu to pass the detention order under Section 2(f) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. According to the petitioner, originally cases were registered for the offence under Section 420 IPC, which were subsequently altered into Sections 406, 307, 506(ii) IPC, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Drug and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954, read with Section 328 IPC and also under Section 30 of the Arms Act, read with Section 307 IPC as well as under Sections 40, 49-B read with 51(1) Proviso of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972. Out of the above said 27 cases, bail had been granted in favour of the detenu in six cases by the learned Principal Sessions Court, Chennai and by this Court and in the remaining 21 cases, the detenu moved bail applications before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai, and all the 21 bail applications were pending at the time of passing the order of detention.
3. The main grounds of attack on the order of detention in the petition as well as arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are that this Court in Crl.O.P.No.15913 and 15914 of 2009 by order dated 24.8.2009 already prohibited the detenu from practising Siddha and Ayurvedic Medicines and therefore there is no pressing necessity to pass the order of detention by the Detaining Authority and non-consideration of the above aspect vitiates the detention order on the ground of non-application of mind. The detenu being a registered Medical Practitioner, registered his name with the Tamil Nadu Siddha Medical Council from 7.9.1998, can effectively be prohibited from practise, either by suspending the registration or otherwise under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1970, by the competent authorities, if there is any violation in his medical practice, and non-consideration of the above aspect by the Detaining Authority vitiates the order of detention. The allegation that the detenu cheated the patients by promising cure after receiving large sums of money cannot be treated as disturbance of public order as tempo of the Society was not affected in any locality. The documents sought for by the detenu for submitting his effective representation having not been furnished, the further continuance of detention order is impermissible. The detenu having been already prevented from practise, as he has been confined in prison, there is no further need to pass the detention order to prevent his alleged activities.
4. The second respondent filed counter affidavit wherein it is stated that till the date of detention order, the detenu was found to be involved in 27 cases. The representation sent on behalf of the detenu was considered by the first respondent on time. The detenu having been found acting in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and to prevent him from indulging in such activities in future, he was detained under Act 14 of 1982 on public interest. The grounds of detention were informed to the detenu's wife on 18.9.2009 by post, the very next day of passing of the order of detention. For the representation of the detenu, detailed remarks were sent by the second respondent to the first respondent without any delay, which was rejected by the first respondent. Insofar as the alleged alteration of the charges, the Investigating Officer, during the course of investigation, came to know about the further developments based on which charges were altered. Though bail applications were ordered in six cases, insofar as other 21 cases are concerned bail applications are pending, which are likely to be ordered on similar footing and therefore there is an imminent possibility of coming out on bail by the detenu. The activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as he gave false interview through electronic media and the public at large were made to believe his false promise and thereby cheated number of persons, who are innocent patients and at last when some of the innocent victims requested to return the money after they did not get cured, they were threatened with dire consequences by showing pistol, which created panic among the general public. Only to prevent the indulgence in such further activity, the order of detention was passed against the detenu.
5. The learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu submitted arguments in the light of the submissions made supra by citing various decisions in support of his submissions.
6. The learned Public Prosecutor also relying upon the counter affidavit as well as the documents, made his submissions and cited decisions in support of his contentions.
7. From the above pleadings it has to be ascertained as to whether the order of detention of the detenu is vitiated in any manner.
8. The detenu is a Medical Practitioner, registered his name with the Tamil Nadu South Medical Council, Chennai. In the grounds of detention it is stated that in the year 2007, the detenu gave an interview in Jaya TV (Tamil TV Channel) that he will cure all diseases including brain ailment in his Travancore Raja Vaidyasalai at No.42, Karpagambal Nagar, Mylapore, Chennai-4, and after watching the same, one Janakiraman, contacted him in his Vaidyasalai for curing his disease affected child and the detenu demanded a sum of Rs.13,86,000/- for treatment, and told the said Janakiraman that the patient should take Thanga Baspam and Deer meat for six months. In January, 2008, the said Janakiraman, believing the words of the detenu, paid Rs.6 lakhs and at that time the detenu informed the said Janakiraman that he had made ready Thanga Baspam and if the balance amount of Rs.7.86 lakhs is paid, he will get the Deer meat and thereafter the treatment could be started. The balance sum of Rs.7.86 lakhs was also paid by the said Janakiraman during March, 2008 and even after one month, the detenu informed that the medicine was not yet made ready and that the said Janakiraman can contact him after one month. During 2008, when Janakiraman further approached the detenu for treatment, he gave false reasons and thereby he developed doubts and requested the detenu to return the money. At that time the detenu threatened the said Janakiraman that if the said incident is reported to anyone, he will kill him. Due to the fear and danger to life he did not complain to the Police at that time. The said Janakiraman, having seen newspapers and TV news that the detenu was arrested by the police on the basis of the complaint given by another person, has also lodged a complaint, which was registered as crime No.405 of 2009 of the Central Crime Branch under section 406, 420, 307 and 506(ii) IPC.
9. During the course of investigation, the detenu was arrested and remanded to judicial custody and thereafter at the request of the police, the detenu was given in police custody for six days. During investigation, the police recovered documents, sample medicines, pistol, etc., and thereafter the case was altered into one under the above said offences. While the detenu was in Central Prison, the Central Crime Branch registered three more cases in Crime Nos.386/2009, 395/2009 and 402/2009 for similar offences and earlier also 22 cases were registered against the detenu in crime Nos.664/2009, 680/2009, 685/2009, 695/2009, 718/2009, 719/2009, 720/2009, 721/2009, 731/2009, 750/2009, 751/2009, 759/2009, 760/2009, 772/2009, 773/2009, 802/2009, 803/2009, 804/2009806/2009, 824/2009, 825/2009 and 830/2009 on the file of E-1 Mylapore Police Station. The detaining authority taken note of the bail order granted by this Court in Crl.O.P.Nos.13913 and 13914 of 2009 as well as the bail granted in four other cases and that in the remaining cases also the detenu moved bail applications and the same are pending. It is also recorded in the detention order that even in the said cases in which bail applications were moved, the detenu is likely to come out on bail and if he comes out on bail it will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and normal recourse to criminal law would not have the desired effect to effectively prevent the detenu from indulging in such activity and therefore he is to be detained under Section 2(f) of the Act 14 of 1982.
10. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the detenue insofar as the bail order imposing condition by this Court is concerned, we are of the view that the Detaining Authority was aware of the said order which is also referred to in the grounds of detention. Further, the said order nowhere prohibits the detenu from giving false promise through media. Hence the contention with regard to non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority insofar as that aspect is concerned, cannot be sustained.
11. Insofar as the contention with regard to the non-supply of alleged documents demanded by the detenu is concerned, the representation was considered by the first respondent. The prejudice caused due to the non-supply of any particular document, is not specifically pointed out by raising additional grounds. Hence we are rejecting the said contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu.
12. In the ground case No.8, viz., in crime No.721 of 2009 on the file of the E-1 Mylapore Police Station, a statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. from one Tmt.Umamaheswari is recorded, which is found at page Nos.214 to 218. In the said statement it is stated that while she was imparting treatment for her second son in August, 2005, she stayed at Chennai and she watched a programme in Jaya T.V. and Vijay T.V., which telecasted the propaganda of the detenu and believing the same, she was induced to impart treatment for her son. She met the detenu along with her husband, her father and one of her relatives by name Iyanarappan for the treatment of her second son and handed over a sum of Rs.18 lakhs to the detenu on various dates. In the year 2007 the detenu induced to give Deer meat treatment. In the said statement it is further stated that the detenu killed one deer on 18.2.2007 in the presence of Tmt.Umamaheswari and her brother and cooked the deer meat with some other meat and started treatment for her son. The above statements clearly reveal that there is substance in the charge registered against the detenu under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 and under Sections 40, 49-B read with 51(1) Proviso to Wild Life Protection Act, 1972.
13. With regard to the contention that the detenu had not acted in the manner prejudicial to the public order and even assuming that he had cheated number of persons, subject to proof, will not be prejudicial to the public order, and same has to be ascertained on the facts of this case.
14. With regard to the demand and acceptance of huge money by the detenu on the ground that he will cure the disease of any kind and making promises in the name of the God and to return the money if not cured through the programmes telecasted in the electronic media, is an inducement of the public at large. Several persons across the State, believing the words of the detenu, allegedly paid huge amounts to the detenu and actual payment made by some of them on being demanded back, the detenu threatened them with dire consequences by showing pistol. Thus, the act of the detenu is having a wider ramification from among the public at large and therefore his acts of making false promise to cure any kind of disease through electronic media and cheating large number of innocent people across the State and collecting huge money and when demanded for return of the money, threatening them with dire consequences by showing pistol, are definitely coming within the purview of the disturbance of public order and really affecting the tempo of the Society, though not restricted in a particular locality.
15. It is an admitted fact that some section of the society is fond of one or other TV Channel and the said TV Channel viewers form a class by themselves, though not definite. Giving false promise to cure any disease like a magician and alluring people to meet him for treatment on payment of huge sum, is definitely affecting the tempo of the society, thus attracting the meaning of "disturbance of public order". The said action of the detenu cannot be treated as merely cheating particular individual, but should be treated as cheating the community at large, or at least a cross section of the Society.
16. The allegation made against the detenu is that he is indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order by way of advertisement in electronic media by giving false promise and collecting huge sums of money by inducing the patients. The said activity, prejudicial to the maintenance of public health, will definitely come under the meaning of disturbance of public order.
(a) In the decision reported in (1995) 3 SCC 237 (Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M.Mehta), 'public order' and 'law and order' are explained by the Supreme Court in paragraph 9, which reads thus,
"9. Further, sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act confers power on the State Government and a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police under the direction of the State Government to detain a person on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The explanation attached to sub-section (4) of Section 3 reproduced above in the foregoing para contemplates that public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in sub-section (4) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 also provides that for the purpose of Section 3, a person shall be deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when such person is a dangerous person and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a dangerous person his alleged activities fall within the ambit of the expression public order. A distinction has to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order because most often the two expressions are confused and detention orders are passed by the authorities concerned in respect of the activities of a person which exclusively fall within the domain of law and order and which have nothing to do with the maintenance of public order. In this connection it may be stated that in order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the fall out and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society. It is the degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a breach of law and order or it amounts to public order. If the activity falls within the category of disturbance of public order then it becomes essential to treat such a criminal and deal with him differently than an ordinary criminal under the law as his activities would fall beyond the frontiers of law and order, disturbing the even tempo of life of the community of the specified locality. In the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B. ((1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67) this Court had an occasion to deal with the distinction between law and order and public order. Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court observed that public order would embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. It has been further observed that the implications of public order are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Again in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police (1989 Supp (1) SCC 322 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 438) this Court took the view that in order that an activity may be said to affect adversely the maintenance of public order, there must be material to show that there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public. If any act of a person creates panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public upsetting the even tempo of life of the community, such act must be said to have a direct bearing on the question of maintenance of public order. The commission of an offence will not necessarily come within the purview of public order which can be dealt with under ordinary general law of the land."
(b) In (2004) 7 SCC 467 (Commissioner of Police v. C.Anita), the meaning of 'law and order' and 'public order' were discussed and held as follows:
"7. ........ The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression law and order is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, public order has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. The question to ask is:
Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed?
This question has to be faced in every case on its facts."
The said decision is reiterated in (2008) 9 SCC 89 (K.K.Saravana Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu)(para 28).
17. Interference in preventive detention orders by the Courts in habeas corpus petitions was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 301 (Additional Secretary to the Government of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia). The grounds on which the Courts may interfere in the detention orders are held to be very limited, which read thus,
(i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed,
(ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person,
(iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose,
(iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds,
or
(v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so.
Or any other contingency like the above said five conditions, which was reported in the decision reported in (1994) 6 SCC 14 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1580 (Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L.Himingliana).
18. In the decision reported in (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 128 (State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande), the preventive detention and scope of judicial review is explained in paragraphs 36 to 39, which read thus,
"Preventive detention: necessary evil
36. Liberty of an individual has to be subordinated, within reasonable bounds, to the good of the people. The framers of the Constitution were conscious of the practical need of preventive detention with a view to striking a just and delicate balance between need and necessity to preserve individual liberty and personal freedom on the one hand and security and safety of the country and interest of the society on the other hand. Security of State, maintenance of public order and services essential to the community, prevention of smuggling and blackmarketing activities, etc. demand effective safeguards in the larger interests of sustenance of a peaceful democratic way of life.
37. In considering and interpreting preventive detention laws, courts ought to show greatest concern and solitude in upholding and safeguarding the fundamental right of liberty of the citizen, however, without forgetting the historical background in which the necessityan unhappy necessitywas felt by the makers of the Constitution in incorporating provisions of preventive detention in the Constitution itself. While no doubt it is the duty of the court to safeguard against any encroachment on the life and liberty of individuals, at the same time the authorities who have the responsibility to discharge the functions vested in them under the law of the country should not be impeded or interfered with without justification (vide A.K. Roy v. Union of India, Bhut Nath Mete v. State of W.B., State of W.B. v. Ashok Dey and ADM v. Shivakant Shukla).
Subjective satisfaction: scope of judicial review
38. Subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of preventive detention conferred on the executive, the court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority; if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad.
39. A court cannot go into correctness or otherwise of the facts stated or allegations levelled in the grounds in support of detention. A court of law is the last appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based. That, however, does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from judicial reviewability. By judicial decisions, courts have carved out areas, though limited, within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested judicially."
From the perusal of the above judgment it is evident that subjective satisfaction should be arrived at by the Detaining Authority and the sufficiency of the materials to arrive at subjective satisfaction cannot be gone into by the Courts on the ground of judicial review of the detention order.
19. Here in this case, the conditional bail granted by this Court in two cases; the grant of bail in four cases by the Principal Sessions Court, Chennai; and pendency of bail petitions in respect of 21 other cases, are all taken into consideration, apart from the likelihood of release of the detenu in these cases and thereafter only subjective satisfaction was recorded by the Detaining Authority to prevent the indulgence of such activity viz., giving advertisement through electronic media and alluring public in general to get treatment for their diseases from the detenu by paying huge sums, in violation of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972; Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954; and the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. As noticed by us, the conditions imposed in the bail orders are not permanent conditions and are subject to modification at any time, on the request of the detenu by filing appropriate application. Hence there cannot be any effective prevention of the detenu from indulging in such further activities for a considerable period of time.
20. In the decision reported in (2004) 8 SCC 591 (State of U.P. v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta), the Supreme Court held 'it is not the number of Acts that matters while ordering preventive detention, what has to be seen is the effect of the Act on the even tempo of life, the extent of its reach upon the society and its impact.'
21. In (2006) 2 SCC 664 (T.V.Sravanan v. State), the Supreme Court held that for recording the satisfaction of imminent possibility of coming out on bail by the detenu, materials are to be available on record and in the absence of availability of such records, the order can be treated as without due application of mind.
22. The decision cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in Criminal Appeal No.2121 of 2009 dated 13.11.2009 is in respect of preventing the detenu from indulging in smuggling activities, against whom already confiscation of passport was ordered. Therefore, in that case the Supreme Court was satisfied that the contention of the detenu that the detenu was already effectively prevented and therefore no further detention order was necessary.
23. In the light of our above findings, we are of the view that there is no infirmity in the order of detention passed against the detenu and no case is made out to interfere with the order of detention dated 17.9.2009.
There is no merit in the habeas corpus petition and the same stands dismissed.
vr
To
1. The Secretary to Government,
Prohibition & Excise Department,
Fort St. George, Chennai 600 009.
2. The Commissioner of Police,
Egmore,
Chennai 600 008